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activities. Our results add to the existing literature on the long term cost of 
macroeconomic crises. 
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  31 Introduction
Under the assumption that households have access to a complete market in contingent claims,
marginal utilities of consumption and of human capital investments are not a®ected by
purely idiosyncratic shocks. Accordingly investment decisions, including those in human
capital, are determined solely by rates of return. However, in the presence of credit and
insurance market imperfections, labor market shocks and °uctuations can have a deep impact
in household consumption and time allocation behavior. Self-insurance strategies or informal
arrangement to cope with unexpected shocks might include the liquidation of physical assets
or the reallocation of time of family-members towards income-earning activities, and possibly
a decrease in human capital investments. As a consequence income shocks might increase the
transmission of poverty across generations and have long term consequences on inequality.
This paper examines the consequences of credit market imperfections for households'
human capital investment in Argentina during the economic crisis of the late 1990's and
early 2000's. We use data over the period 1995 - 2002 to cover both a recessionary and
a growth period. During periods of aggregate instability families are likely to experience
di±culties accessing credit; as a consequence, negative shocks to household income may lead
to a higher involvement in productive activities by household members. If young household
members are those who increase participation in home and market production they will
have to sacri¯ce part of their time at school and consequently reduce their investment in
human capital. By comparing the response of human capital investment decisions to negative
household income shocks in di®erent macroeconomic scenarios we can test for the presence
of credit market imperfections.
For developing countries there is growing empirical evidence that these concerns apply to
rural areas and a®ect child labor supply. Jacoby and Skou¯as (1997) and Jacoby (1994) ¯nd
that Indian agrarian households lacking access to formal ¯nancial markets are found to draw
upon the labor of their children when faced with an income shortfall. A wide literature also
examines the consequences of the macroeconomic crisis su®ered by Indonesia. Frankenberg,
2Smith and Thomas (2003) ¯nd that household's labor supply increase during the crisis while
Thomas, Beegle, Frankenberg, Sikoki, Strauss and Teruel (2004) ¯nd evidence of a negative
e®ect of the macroeconomic shock on the attendance rate of younger children with older
siblings in the household. However, Indonesia had a very large rural sector in which to work
during the crisis.
Evidence of whether the same concerns are relevant for the relatively wealthier urban
areas typically characterized by a wide heterogeneity in the nature and e®ectiveness of formal
safety nets is remarkably rare. Based on panel data from urban Brazil, Duryea (1998)
examines the role of transitory shocks to household income in children's advancement through
school in Brazil. Her results show that children's time is used to bu®er rare transitory income
shocks to households in ways that are consistent with education models that incorporate
insurance or credit market imperfections. On the same data Duryea, Lam and Levinson
(2007) ¯nd that unemployment shocks signi¯cantly increase the probability that a child
enters the labor force, drops out of school and fails to advance. In particular teenager girls
are the most a®ected by the household shock. Looking to the Mexican peso crisis Parker
and Skou¯as (2006) ¯nd that while signi¯cant added-worker e®ects are in place for adult
females, for teenage males there is no signi¯cant evidence that labor force participation,
school attendance and the likelihood of advancing to the next school grade are in°uenced
by the event of unemployment of the household head. This is in contrast to Attanasio and
Sz¶ ekely (2004) ¯ndings that show that Mexican households tend to react to idiosyncratic
shocks reducing human capital expenditures. Finally, consistent with the hypothesis of
income e®ects driving the labor market incentives of children, Schady (2002) ¯nds positive
e®ects on schooling attainment of urban peruvian children aged 11 to 17 years old during
the macroeconomic crisis of 1988-1992.
Evidence based on urban data is more mixed than in rural areas partly because macroe-
conomic circumstances also in°uence the incentives of child labor. In particular as the labor
market conditions determine the likelihood that the household heads loose their job, they
3also determine the average wage children can expect to receive entering the labor market,
thus a®ecting the opportunity cost of schooling.1 A change in the wage that a child can
earn has both income and substitution e®ects on children's time allocation decisions. Chil-
dren who work to meet a standard of consumption will work fewer hours when their wage
increases (income e®ect), while the substitution e®ect implies that children will work more
when wages increases.
This paper examines the labor market and educational behavior of teens both during
recession and high growth years in urban areas of Argentina. We focus on teenage children
both because recent e®orts to increase schooling attendance have been targeted at this group
and also because teenagers may be in a better position to contribute to household income
than younger children. Our analysis focuses mainly on the educational and work behavior
of boys as previous research suggests that they are more likely than girls to participate in
market activities to insure the household (UNICEF (1997), EANNA (2004)).2 However, for
comparison purposes, we replicate the same empirical analysis for girls.
In our empirical investigation the presence of negative idiosyncratic income shocks is
measured by unemployment spells a®ecting the household head. There may be the concern
that interruptions in the work career of the head are not exogenous to the educational and
labor market performance of teenagers in the household. Accordingly we need to ¯nd a valid
instrumental variable to estimate the causal e®ect of idiosyncratic shocks on teenagers be-
havior. In rural settings natural events, typically rainfalls, are used as a source of exogenous
variation for household head's unemployment spells. In urban settings it is more di±cult to
¯nd a valid instrument. In this paper we use trade related measures, namely export prices
and measures of import penetration for the sectors in which the household head works, as
a source of exogenous variation for the unemployment probability. Both instruments are
1Clearly also their probability of ¯nding a job is a®ected by general conditions, depending on the sepa-
ration of the two labor markets or the substitutability of adult work with child work.
2Studies which do have access to information about children's time use (Levison, Moe and Knaul (2001),
Cigno and Rosati (2005), or Emerson and Souza (2002)), show that while for girls the traditional work -
school tradeo® is far from resolved, the relevant work activity to be considered in the analysis of girls' time
use is house chores work.
4shown to be highly correlated with unemployment spells while not being a choice variable
of the worker.
We ¯nd evidence that during periods of economic deceleration unemployment spells by
the household head have a negative e®ect on boys and girls' human capital investment. In
contrast, these spells do not a®ect schooling progress during growth periods. Our study of
labor market behavior also suggests that boys schooling failure results from their greater
involvement in market activities. For girls, we do not ¯nd evidence that the failure is
produced by a similar mechanism. This result is consistent with previous research where girls'
time is more likely to be employed in home production. On the whole, our results indicate
that during periods of economic instability, when access to credit is more di±cult, households
use teens' time to insure themselves against negative labor market shocks. Accordingly
macroeconomic crisis and related ¯nancial market failures have important costs in terms of
human capital investment by teens.
The paper proceeds as follows: in the next section we outline the macroeconomic con-
ditions of Argentina during the period under study. Section 3 contains a description of the
theoretical framework of reference. Section 4 presents the data and empirical strategy and
Section 5 discusses the results followed by some concluding remarks.
2 Argentina economy and education system
2.1 The economy
After a decade of recurring debt crisis and stagnating growth, in 1991 Argentina imple-
mented a wide ranging set of reforms such as liberalizing the country to foreign capital and
trade, as well as reforming the labor market and ¯xing the exchange rate to the dollar.
Economic opening and regional integration increased both exports and imports. In general,
trade opening led to a higher surge in imports than in exports, that produced a structural
negative trade balances. The currency board was partly responsible for this disappointing
5performance since it kept the price of exported goods arti¯cially high. As a matter of fact
exports recovered after the 2001 crisis, supported by the strong devaluation of the local cur-
rency. The impact of the increase in imports during the 1990s was negative as a result of the
industrial restructuring and a rise in labour productivity (Galiani and Hopenhayn (2003)).
The unemployment rose from nearly 6% at the end of the 1980s to around 15% at the end
of the 1990s and over 20% during the 2001-2002 crisis.3
Table (A-1) shows some key macroeconomic indicators over the period 1995 2002. This
period is of particular interest as it includes 3 years of high growth 1996, 1997, 1998 after
which Argentina entered in a prolonged recession coupled with 3 years of de°ation.
2.2 The education system and child labor
Since 1884 Argentina established mandatory primary school: this involved 7 years of educa-
tion for children aged 6 to 12. Secondary school (nivel medio) followed from age 13 to 17.
Both primary and secondary schooling have traditionally been public and free.4 In 1993 the
mandatory years of schooling increased from 7 to 10. Last year of pre-school at age 5 and
the ¯rst two of high school (age 13 and 14) became obligatory.
Table (A-2) describes upgrading and repetition rates by grade and year. All the rates
reported- promotion, repetition, lagging behind and dropping out- show a dramatic change
passing from grade 7 (the old primary school - mandatory school) to grade 8 (old secondary
school). However, the reform seems to have had some e®ect as all the rates improve over
time, in spite of adverse economic conditions.
Argentinean legislation prohibits work to children younger than 14 years old (law on
work contract 1976) and strictly limits the hours of work and working conditions of the
children aged 14 to 17 years old. The Children's and Teenagers' Activities survey (Encuesta
de Actividades de Ni~ nas, Ni~ nos y Adolescentes, EANNA) designed to measure the incidence
3Calvo, Izquierdo and Talvi (2003) explain in detail the macroeconomic context of the crisis. For a review
on the e®ects on workers/ households see McKenzie (2004) or Giovagnoli, Fiszbein and Adriz (2003).
4According to o±cial statistics from the Argentinean Ministry of Education for the period 1996-2000,
only 20% of primary school pupils and roughly 27-28% of secondary school pupils attended private schools.
6of child labor in Argentina found that in 2004 6.5% of children aged 5 to 13 years old worked
at least an hour in the market or doing house work, while this ¯gure was about 20% for
the children aged 14 to 17 years old. These percentages are much higher than the ¯gures
found in our sample as they include hours of homework, and they include rural areas, where
helping in the parents farm is a relatively common task.
According to the EANNA, the most common activity for boys aged 5 to 17 in urban
areas is to work in shops and workshops, while for girls the main occupation is housework
taking care of younger children, elderly and sick persons. This is why in our analysis, we
will consider primarily boys, as girls's opportunity cost of schooling is badly represented
by market wage. Both home and market work clearly a®ect the schooling performance of
children. This is evident from table (A-4) constructed with the information in our sample.5
3 Theoretical framework
To investigate the implications of household head unemployment on teens human capital
investment we take as a theoretical framework of reference the model in Jacoby and Skou¯as
(1997). Consider a household i that has a single child eligible for school over a year t over the
time interval [0;T]. Households are assumed to derive utility from household's consumption
Cit in each period and the bequest left to the child at the end of the schooling phase. The
bequest consists of a child human capital stock Hi;T+1 valued by an increasing and concave









5The corresponding statistics from EANNA in 2004 are broadly comparable in magnitude taking in
account the fact that our data only considers market labor activities.




¸t[Cit + WtSit] · ¸tYit (2)
where Sit is the time-e®ort spent in schooling, Wt is the price of the time spent in schooling
or spot market wage rate for teenagers, ¸t is the general price level and Yit is total family
income. Education in Argentina is free thus the only cost of schooling is represented mainly
by foregone production or earnings. We assume that child wage rate di®er across regions,
sexes and age. In particular we de¯ne a wage rate for those kids aged 12-15, who have low
human capital and experience and are subject to school obligation, and those aged 16-18
which can legally, even if with restrictions, participate in the labor market. Human capital
(years of school) is accumulated according to the following technology:
Hi;t+1 = g(Sit;Hi;t;µi;t) (3)
Maximizing (1) subject to (2) and (3), gives rise to usual Euler equation. Human capital









where ½t=½t¡1 is the shadow price of consumption in period t relative to consumption in
period t ¡ 1.6 Under the assumption that there is a complete market in contingent claims,
Altug and Miller (1990) show that ½it = ´iµt. ´ is the Lagrange multiplier on the household's
lifetime budget constraint, whose value is determined by the household's lifetime wealth and
µ is the aggregate shock in time t. The intuition behind this result is that a complete set of
contingent claims allows households to smooth their marginal utility over lifetime, except for
the fact that in equilibrium they cannot insure against aggregate shocks µ. First di®erencing
6In other words ½t and ½t¡1 are the Lagrangean multipliers associated with respectively period t and t¡1
budget constraints.
8the logarithm of ½ yields ¢ln½it = ¢lnµt + ¢ln´i = ¢lnµt. Note that ¸ the price level is
the same for all households thus it is incorporated into the aggregate shock ¢lnµt µ captures
aggregate shocks to prices and wages which are assumed to be set collectively. A natural
means of testing full insurance is therefore to consider the following model:
¢lnS = ¢lnW + ¢lnµ + ¹Kit + ²it (5)
where ²it contains preference shocks and measurement error, and Kit represent the idiosyn-
cratic shock to the marginal utility of wealth. Note that the above equation does not include
the expectation error, as these are common to everybody and are incorporated in the aggre-
gate shock.7
Equation (5) can be estimated by using a set of time dummies to capture the ¯rst
di®erence of aggregate shocks µ. As a measure of the shock to the marginal utility of
wealth we use household's head unemployment during the academic year. Household's head
employment status is likely to be correlated with a household's unobserved components of
tastes if they are decision variables for the household (e.g., Ham and Jacobs (2000)). This
could invalidate the results of our test, to address this concern we will use instrumental
variables discussed in the next section.
Under full insurance ¹ should be zero. Note that in the above speci¯cation we impose
separability between family consumption and human capital investments. Ham and Jacobs
(2000) analyze the importance of the assumption of separability between leisure and con-
sumption decisions and conclude that separability does not signi¯cantly a®ect the results
for full insurance test as the one presented here. This is because the e®ect of the omitted
choice variable (omitting either leisure or consumption is equivalent to assuming separabil-
ity) will be mostly captured by the time dummies. Note also that the above model is in
di®erences and thus it does not include any variable constant over time. However, as our
primary interest is to measure deviations to full insurance we include some preference shifters
7This is di®erent from what one would obtain in a permanent income/rational expectations model.
9in our speci¯cation. Thus our test results are conditional on a set of demographic variables
such as the age of the child and the education level of the parents. This set of preference
shifter allows for the possibility that the marginal utility derived from human capital invest-
ment varies considerably according to the parents' own educational attainment. Under this






tU(Cit) + Á(Hi;T+1)exp(±1Xc + ±2Xp)
#
(6)
where Xc and Xp are the age of the child and the education level of the parents respectively.
The previous model suggests that if households can fully insure against risk, changes
over time in teenagers' human capital investments of households who are fully sharing risk
depend on changes in their collective resources, but not on changes in the distribution among
them of those resources. Thus testing full risk insurance across a set of households simply
requires examining cross-section correlation between their changes in educational investment
and their change in resources. That is, we can estimate the relationship in (5).
4 Data and empirical strategy
Our main source of data is the Permanent Household Survey (Encuesta Permanente de
Hogares, EPH) from 1995 to 2002. This is a national socio-economic survey collected by
the Argentinean Statistical Institute (INDEC) in the major urban areas of Argentina. In its
most recent wave the survey covers 29 urban centers, which represent 70% of urban national
population and 61% of the national population. 8 The EPH is the only survey that covers
the whole country for a long period of time.
The survey is conducted twice per year, in May and October. The survey, identical in
both waves, contains an individual questionnaire and a household questionnaire surveying
the family characteristics and standards of living. Since the academic year in Argentina runs
8Note that the rural population in Argentina represents less than 10% of total population.
10between March and November, the two waves contain information on schooling attendance
during the third and eight month of the academic year, respectively.
The survey is designed as a rotating panel. Each household is interviewed in four con-
secutive waves, after the forth round it is removed and replaced by a new household. The
design is such that in any given cross section of EPH, 25% of the households are in their
¯rst interview, 25% are in their second interview and so on. We construct two years panels
following each 25% of households from March to March.
Although the length of the panel at the household level is short, the data allows us to
follow teens attendance and progress in school over a year time, and at the same time track
the employment and earnings experiences of their family members. The sample is restricted
to young members in the household aged 12 to 18 years old over the period 1995-2002, who
are enrolled, cohabit with their parents and whose household head is employed at the time
of the ¯rst interview (May). Household heads who are currently unemployed in the ¯rst
observation may have already experienced a shock and, therefore, be deviated from their
long run path.
Our measure of interest is whether children and teenagers successfully complete the grade
at which they are enrolled at the time of the ¯rst interview. We de¯ne upgrading individuals
as those who in the third observation (i.e. March of the year after the household was ¯rst
interviewed) declare to be enrolled in a higher grade respective to the previous year or
have completed the grade they were enrolled in. To complete our empirical analysis we
also track these individuals labor market behavior from the ¯rst to the third observation.
For the household head we reconstruct working histories using questions on the duration of
the employment or of the unemployment spell. We can therefore classify heads as always
employed if in the three observations they declare to be employed and their experience or
tenure in the second year is greater than in the ¯rst observation. All other cases, excluding
voluntary changes in occupation, are categorized as events creating a negative shock to the
11household's income.9 With two waves per year over 8 years, we have an average of 2,000-
2,500 boys (girls) per year and thus our ¯nal sample contains roughly 8,600 observations for
each gender. We do not include information in surveys before 1995 as the sample design is
di®erent and households are not easily tracked over a year time.
Tables (A-3) and (A-5) present some descriptive statistics for our sample. Table (A-3)
shows the probabilities that the household head remains employed throughout the academic
year by educational level. We can identify three di®erent levels of education: only primary
or less than primary education, at most secondary and more than secondary school. The
probability of remaining employed increases in the educational level attained suggesting that
unemployment risk and volatility is unequally distributed and that low skilled heads are more
likely to experience unemployment spells. The time trend and timing of the crisis are also
clear from this table. Table (A-5) shows the labor market participation rate of children
younger than 15, - thus subject to the mandatory schooling rule - and older than 15, both
for household heads who are always employed throughout the period examined and those who
experience an unemployment spell. The table suggests that older children are much more
likely to participate in market activities and that children of households heads experiencing
unemployment spells have higher chances of entering the labor force. However mandatory
schooling seems successful in limiting labor market participation among the youngest when
the head becomes unemployed. These patterns characterize the labor market behavior of
boys as well as that of girls. Thus the ¯gures in this table indicates that the Argentinean
economic crisis in the late 1990's and early 2000's seems to have interrupted the improving
trend into reductions of child labor participation and school interruption. Next we explore
the contribution of ¯nancial market incompleteness in explaining these trends in children
and teens educational behavior.
We ¯rst focus on educational behavior and estimate a model for the probability of up-
9We follow the o±cial de¯nition of employment participation in which an individual is considered to be
in the workforce if he or she was employed for 1 hour or more of paid work in the week of reference; or if he
or she did work for 15 hours or more without a pay; or if he or she did not work in the reference week for
reasons due to leave, vacation, strike, or illness but maintained his or her employment status.
12grading. Progress to a higher grade can be thought to be a function of the child's e®ort spent
on schoolwork. This e®ort, ec
it *, can not be observed; however it can be considered a latent
variable that in°uences the likelihood of upgrading. Accordingly we model the upgrading
probability using an indicator variable ¢Schild
it that takes value 1 if ec
it * exceeds an unob-
servable threshold and therefore the child is promoted to the next grade, and 0 otherwise.
We test for credit market imperfections in a model of children's schooling progress where
the employment status of the household head is included as an explanatory variable. The
coe±cient on this variable can be interpreted as an indicator for the presence of imperfect
insurance markets.
The economic literature has widely documented that the economic behavior of children
resembles that of their parents (see Mulligan (1997); Solon (1999)). Thus our empirical
speci¯cation allows the unobserved factors a®ecting the schooling behavior of children to be
correlated with those a®ecting the labor market behavior of the household head. Accordingly
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it is the indicator of progression in school for child i. Ehh
it is an indicator variable
taking value 1 if the head in child i0s household has not experienced an unemployment spell
during the academic year and 0 otherwise. We assume that the employment experiences of
the household heads depend upon a vector of household characteristics, Xif, which include
the age and educational level of the household head and his/her partner, family size, number
and gender composition of household members younger than 18 years, the partner's work-
ing status in the ¯rst observation, an indicator for the presence of persons older than 60
years, a house ownership indicator and the number of rooms and other characteristics of the
13house. Zit refers to the variables that are used as instruments to identify the causal e®ect
of household head unemployment. The variables in Zit are carefully discussed at the end of
this section.
The schooling model in equation (7) contains a vector of child's characteristics, Xic, such
as child's age and an indicator for being subject to school obligation or not. It also includes
the education level of the parents, Xip, to take account of di®erences in preferences among
families. ¢lnWit accounts for the log wages of children and teens in the year of reference.
This variable is included to capture the e®ect of changes in the opportunity cost of college.
The variable is constructed as the mean wage in the individual's cell, where cells are de¯ned
on the basis of region, gender and an indicator for whether he/she is older than the minimum
school-leaving age (i.e. 15 years old). Real mean wages at the cell level are computed from
the entire sample of individuals between 12 and 18 years old in the EFH survey in each
semester and not just the subsample of households in our panel.10 In addition both the
schooling and the employment equation include a set of year, Yit, and regional dummies, Rit.
Year dummies are used to control for the role of common aggregate shocks and to absorb







are the unobserved terms in the model a®ecting the employment status
of the household head and the child's schooling, respectively. Those factors, such as ability
or preferences for studying and working, are likely to be transferred across generations.
Accordingly we estimate a model that takes into account the potential correlation in the







normally distributed we estimate the unknown parameters in equations (8) to (7) using a
bivariate probit model.
The bivariate probit model assumes that "E
it and "S
it have mean zero and variance-
covariance matrix V , which has unit diagonal elements and o®-diagonal elements equal
10The nominal wage for each individual in any given semester was de°ated by the simple average of the
value of the national consumer price index (CPI) prevailing in each month of the academic year. The monthly
CPI was obtained from the INDEC website.
14to ½jk = ½kj. In estimating the model parameters, the evaluation of the likelihood func-
tion requires the computation of bivariate normal integrals, which are approximated via the
Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane smooth recursive simulator.11
In the presence of unobserved factors shared by children and their parents, identifying the
causal e®ect of household head's unemployment in equation ( 7) requires the use of instru-
mental variables. Here we propose the use of two alternative instruments that are denoted by
Zit in equation (8) and are likely to have a®ected the demand for labor in Argentina during
the period, but not the supply side. Thus not being a choice variable for the worker. The
instruments we propose are related to Argentinean trade performance. Argentina liberalized
its trade regime at the beginning of the 1990's. Total trade almost quadrupled between
1990 and 1998. According to traditional trade theory, economic liberalization is meant to
increase trade, accelerate technological change, e±ciency gains and growth. It is argued that
a more e±cient allocation of resources due to trade liberalization will, in the long run, lead
to increased welfare and will have a positive impact on employment as well as on poverty
and inequality. However negative employment e®ects in speci¯c sectors are expected during
the transition period. Based on these considerations we propose two instruments.
The ¯rst instrument is an index of export prices. There are several reasons to support
the conjecture that the price of Argentinean exports is determined in the worldwide market,
without much in°uence of its own economic conditions. First, Argentina is a relatively small
open country, thus it is not supposed to in°uence world market prices. Second, the bulk of
Argentinean exports are agricultural goods, petroleum and combustibles, which are traded
on relatively free international commodities markets. Last, but not least, Argentina adopted
a currency board policy during the 1990's, that prevented exchange rate manipulations to
favor exports.
Our measure of export prices is obtained from the Argentinean Statistics O±ce that
provides export price indexes for major product industries. The indices are constructed in
11Our empirical estimation is performed using the mvprobit program in STATA by Capellari and Jenkins
(2003).
15di®erent ways depending on the product type. For primary products or products not highly
elaborated, the prices used to construct the index refer to unit values available from the
customs registry for any tari® item. Primary products constitute the leading Argentinean
export sectors, and can thus be decomposed in rather precise price indexes, as each product is
listed under a certain tari®. For more elaborated goods, like capital goods or durable goods,
customs registries cannot be used. This is because the various parts of these products,
or the di®erent models of the same product can be subject to di®erent tari®s. Thus for
these goods, the unit values reported in the customs registry can re°ect both changes in
export prices and the application of di®erent tari®s. To construct price indexes for these
sectors, prices of international market leaders are used. Thus for these kind of goods, only
more aggregated price indexes are available.12 For services, which are traded but lack the
information on export prices we use the general export price level, meant to be valid for the
whole economy's exports. Finally, for the public sector/non traded sectors, we set the export
price index equal to 100. The public sector will provide us with a valuable benchmark. While
our instruments are capturing the di®erential impact of trade across sectors, the public sector
remains una®ected by any shock.13
The second instrument we propose is a measure of foreign competition in the industry of
the household head's occupation. Foreign competition can have an impact on domestic com-
panies, giving them incentives to increase their e±ciency, restructuring and cutting working
places. This relationship is empirically well established for the US. Bertrand (2004) and
Revenga (1992) ¯nd a signi¯cant negative impact of import penetration on both wage and
employment rates in di®erent sectors of the US economy. In Argentina import penetration,
calculated as the ratio of imports to gross product added per industry, rose from 5,7% in
1990 to 19% in 1999 for the whole manufacturing sector. Additionally there was substantial
variation in import penetration across industries. For example, sectors where Argentina has
12These prices are already expressed in real terms referring to 1993 prices, we thus do not need to adjust
for in°ation.
13see Corbacho, Garcia-Escribano and Inchauste (2007) for an extensive analysis of the role of the public
sector during Argentinean's crisis.
16a comparative advantage (such as food and beverage production, petroleum distillery and
non metallic products) were not very a®ected and by 1999 foreign industry penetration in
these sectors was below 4%. Complementary evidence on the e®ects of foreign competition
on the national market appears in Galiani and Sanguinetti (2003) who ¯nd a negative and
signi¯cant relationship between import penetration and industries' prices. Moreover, since
the early 1990's the Argentinean employment structure underwent important changes and
unemployment tripled. Some authors have argued that part of it can be attributed to foreign
competition (Galiani and Hopenhayn (2003)).
Previous evidence suggests that the important variations across industries and over time
in the degree of foreign competition can be used to identify the e®ect of household head un-
employment on children and teens' schooling performance. Measures of import penetration
seem to explain employment di®erences across industries, however there is the risk that the
competition faced by one sector or industry is partly determined by its labor force composi-
tion. It is also possible that individuals sort into industries or sectors according to the degree
of foreign competition and thus the risk of becoming unemployed. To prevent these e®ects to
distort our identi¯cation strategy we construct an index of foreign import penetration using
the ¯xed-coe±cient index approach in Katz and Murphy (1992) and Freeman (1975), (1980).
This approach assumes that any increase in the volume of imports between two periods is
distributed across sectors or industries following the distribution that prevailed in the initial
period. Accordingly this approach captures variations in the degree of foreign competition
which are exogenous to the sector's labor force composition.14 To construct the proposed
measure we ¯rst predict imports by year and sector using the imports distribution across
sectors that prevailed in 1993 and then divide this prediction by the gross value added by
sector in the corresponding year.15 We use measures of import penetration on trade at 2
14The ¯xed-coe±cient index approach has been widely used to study the e®ects of immigration on regional
labor markets (Card (2001))
15Imports by sector and year are predicted by multiplying the total volume of imports in the year of
interest by a factor that captures the imports' distribution across sectors in the base period. Our base period
is 1993 as detailed data on import penetration was only available in this period. By 1993 the liberalization
process was mostly completed and thus this year provides an accurate characterization of the new economic
17digit SITC level for the manufacturing sector as available from UNCOMTRADE, data from
trade in services from the IMF Balance of Payment dataset, and data on gross value added
from INDEC.
Note that the model in equations (7) and (8) is in di®erences, thus in estimation individual
characteristics constant over time drop from the error term. Accordingly our instruments will
be valid as long as they are uncorrelated with children and teens' unobserved characteristics
changing over time. While preferences for education and working habits might change with
the economic context, they also have a large persistent component that is inherited from
previous generations (Toledo (2008)) and will not immediately adjust to the new economy.
However, as a robustness check for our identi¯cation strategy, we estimate the schooling
model using as instrument lagged values of export prices in the sector where the household
head is employed. While export prices in the previous period are likely to be correlated
with the current employment level, they are certainly uncorrelated with contemporaneous
idiosyncratic shocks at the individual level.
The model in equation (8) - (7) allows us to analyze the e®ect of household head's un-
employment on children's schooling outcomes and test for the presence of credit market
imperfections. To further investigate the mechanism behind this relationship we explore
the implications of household head's unemployment for children and teens' labor market
behavior. The labor supply of young household members can be used as an informal mech-
anism to insure households against unexpected and negative idiosyncratic shocks such as
unemployment spells. However the time that children and teens spend on various activities
such as work and school is likely to be simultaneously determined. Thus it is reasonable to
expect that an increase in the number of hours a child is employed will reduce time for other
activities and negatively a®ect their schooling outcomes.
To investigate the previous conjecture we regress the change in the child's labor market
status over the academic year on the same set of explanatory variables included in the
environment.
18schooling model in equation (7). The model for the change in the child's labor market
behavior is:
¢Pit = ®P + °PE
hh
it + ¯P¢lnWit + ±1PXci + ±2PXip + &1PRit + &2PYit + "
P
it (9)
where Pit is an indicator value that takes value 1 if the child works in period t and 0
otherwise. Thus the dependent variable in the model can take the values -1, 0 or 1, and
it is obtained from comparing the child's labor market status in March of two consecutive
years. We estimate the model in equation (9) by two-stage least squares using the previous
instruments to control for the potential endogeneity of head's unemployment.
5 Results
In this section we examine the implications of credit market imperfections for human capital
investment decisions. In the presence of full insurance we expect discontinuities in the
work career of the household head not to have any e®ect on the schooling progress of other
household members. In contrast, if household do not fully share risk, interrupted work
careers by the head will negatively a®ect the human capital investment decisions of other
household members, if they have to increase their degree of labor market involvement to
insure the household against income drops. To test this conjecture we ¯rst estimate the
schooling model in equations (8) and (7) for all the years available in the sample. However
imperfections in ¯nancial markets are likely to vary depending on the aggregate state of the
economy, thus we re-estimate the schooling model separately by economic period: a) the
recessionary years 1999-2002, b) the growth years 1996-1998.
We ¯rst estimate the schooling model by a multivariate probit that allows the unobserved
terms in equation (7) and (8) to be correlated. The estimation results of this model for boys
are displayed in Table (1). From this table the coe±cient on the indicator for the absence of
discontinuities in the work career of the household head is positive and statistically signi¯cant
19on the children's likelihood of upgrading for the entire period (i.e. 1995-2002). However this
coe±cient is imprecisely estimated when we run the model separately for the two economic
periods.
As mentioned in the previous section the estimation results in Table (1) do not re°ect the
causal impact of household head unemployment in the presence of unobserved factors associ-
ated both with parents' and children's schooling and labor market performance. To account
for the potential endogeneity of parental unemployment we jointly estimate equation (8)-(7)
using a multivariate probit model that includes as exclusion restrictions in the equation for
the employment situation of the household head the instrumental variables discussed in the
previous section. Table (2) presents the estimation procedure that uses the export price
index as instrument.16 The upper part of the table indicates that the export price index is
statistically correlated with the head employment status both when the model is estimated
on the entire period and when is estimated separately for the growth and crisis years. We
take this result and the discussion about the validity of our instruments reported in the
previous section as evidence that the export price index satis¯es the conditions required to
identify the e®ect of head's job losses on schooling progress.
The lower part of Table 2 corresponds to the estimates of the schooling equation. When
the model is estimated using all the years, the adjusted coe±cient on the indicator variable
for the employment status of the household head reveals a statistically signi¯cant and posi-
tive e®ect of continuous work careers on the upgrading probability of the child. To assess the
magnitude of this e®ect we report the average marginal e®ect on the upgrading probability
conditional on changes in the head's labor market status. This ¯gure indicates that if the
head is continuously employed during the academic year the child's probability of upgrad-
ing increases by 0.154 points, and this e®ect is statistically signi¯cant at the 10% level of
signi¯cance.17 Considering separately crisis and growth years reveals that the coe±cient on
16Using as instrument the degree of import penetration in the sector in which the head is working at the
beginning of the period does not a®ect our main conclusions. These results are available upon request from
the author.
17The standard errors of the average marginal e®ects are computed using the delta method. We are
20head's employment status is only statistically signi¯cant when the model is estimated on the
recessionary period. The average marginal e®ect on the upgrading probability during the
crisis years is slightly above the e®ect estimated on the entire period (i.e. 0.169 points). Thus
employment interruptions by the household head negatively a®ect the schooling behavior of
boys only during recessionary periods.18
For comparison purposes the schooling model has also been estimated as a linear prob-
ability model adjusting the endogeneity of household head unemployment by conventional
instrumental variable techniques. The results of this model are displayed in Table (3). While
the linear probability model is less e±cient that the multivariate probit, the former is still
consistent when the unobserved terms in the model are not normally distributed. A com-
parison of Table (2) and (3) indicates that the results are similar under the two estimation
strategies.
Our results are consistent with estimates by Duryea et al. (2007) for younger children
in Brazil. Her estimates over the 1980s and the 1990s of an unemployment spell during the
academic year for children age 10 to 15 years old is about 0.09 points. This is comparable
to our results taking into account that children in our sample are older.
The other estimated coe±cients in Table 2 are consistent with previous results in the
literature. From the employment equation it seems that more educated workers are less
likely to su®er unemployment spells. Though the corresponding coe±cients are not reported
in the table, we also ¯nd evidence that the characteristics of the spouse, in particular his/her
education and labor market attachment, are important determinants of the head's employ-
ment status. Accordingly household heads whose spouses have higher levels of education
are less likely to su®er unemployment spells, while household heads whose spouse is actively
participating in market activities are associated with a higher probability of su®ering un-
employment spells. These results are consistent with recent models in the economics of the
family in which spousal human capital and labor supply are viewed as an insurance mecha-
grateful to Anna Sanz-de-Galdeano for her advise on this matter.
18The growth years considered discard 1995 when Argentina su®ered from the Mexican Tequila crisis.
21nism against negative shocks to the household (see Cullen and Gruber (2000) for an extensive
survey). The employment model contains some variables such as the characteristics of the
house and the type of tenancy that we use to proxy the long term economic situation of
the family. The coe±cients on these variables indicate that heads who own a house or live
in bigger houses are less likely to su®er an unemployment spell, re°ecting the greater labor
market stability of those individuals living in favorable economic environments. Finally the
year dummies included to capture the e®ect of aggregate economic conditions clearly re°ect
the negative e®ect of the crisis on the individual employment prospects during the early
2000's.
The estimates of the schooling model indicate that children with more educated parents
have higher chances of being successful at school and less likely to participate in market
activities. This result indicates that intergenerational mobility, at least in education, is low
in Argentina. Finally the coe±cient on the variable capturing changes in wages is negatively
correlated with the probability of schooling progress. This is evidence that teens' educational
choices respond to the opportunity cost of staying at school. Accordingly an increase in
the opportunity cost of school, as measured by the wage rate, increases the chances that
individuals drop out from school to participate in market activities.
The most important feature in table 2 is the negative response of children's school progress
to household's idiosyncratic shocks during recessionary periods. This ¯nding clearly lead us
to reject the full market insurance hypothesis in periods of aggregate instability. We now
investigate the potential mechanisms behind the observed academic failure. The data allows
us to explore whether it is due to a reduction in schooling e®ort motivated by a higher degree
of children's labor market involvement. To investigate this possibility we estimate the model
in equation (9).
Table (4) reports the OLS and the IV estimates of the linear probability model for boys'
labor market involvement. The OLS estimates do not identify any statistical relevant e®ect
of household head unemployment on children's labor market behavior. However, this does
22not seem to be the case when the endogeneity of the head's employment status is taken into
account. The IV results in the table correspond to the estimation that uses as exclusion
restriction the export price index. As expected the ¯rst stage regression, in the appendix,
indicates that the export price indicator has a negative and statistically signi¯cant e®ect
on the probability that the head is continuously employed during the academic year. The
second step of the instrumental variables procedure, in Table (4), reveals that the absence of
employment interruptions by the head during the academic year has a negative sizeable and
statistically signi¯cant e®ect on the labor market participation of children during recessionary
periods. The point estimate on the head's employment status variable indicates that the
probability of the child being in the labor market at the beginning of the next academic year
is reduced by 0.219 points if the head has experienced a continuous work career during the
current academic year. This e®ect is comparable to the estimates in Duryea et al. (2007)
for Brazil, where she ¯nds that negative idiosyncratic income shocks are associated with an
increase of 0.18 points in the child's probability to enter the labor market. Also in this case
the e®ect is only statistically signi¯cant during the crisis years suggesting that in moments
of general economic distress, when insurance markets fail, households turn to self insuring
strategies resorting to children work.
A striking result from table (4) is that wages do not seem to provide any incentive to
enter the labor market. It is rather the educational level of the parents the most signi¯-
cant variables associated with children labor market activities. Parental education can be
interpreted as a proxy for permanent income. Thus the previous result suggests that the
decision to let children participate in the labor market is more related to credit constraints
or ¯nancial di±culties than to the opportunity cost of schooling.
As our model in equations (7) or (9) is in di®erences, permanent unobserved factors
di®erence out, and thus individuals choosing a sector on the basis of their permanent tastes
will not cause endogeneity problems. However, as our preferred instrument export prices
by sectors, one might argue that individuals might shift sector of employment because of
23a temporary taste shock. To address this problem we also estimate all the equations using
as instrument the lagged export index price. 19 Results from this instruments are basically
coincident with the ones reported in the appendix for the contemporaneous export price
index.
Finally, we estimate the same schooling and labor supply model for girls. Table (5)
presents the estimates for the schooling advancement. The estimated marginal e®ect indi-
cates that the upgrading probability increases on average by 0.154 points when the house-
hold head is continuously employed during crisis. The results also indicates that employ-
ment experiences by the head do not a®ect girls' schooling outcomes during growth periods.
Accordingly the educational behavior of girls also suggests the presence of credit market
imperfections during periods of aggregate economic distress. We do not ¯nd any e®ect of
the head's employment status on girls labor supply both during growth and recessionary
periods. This evidence support the conjecture that girls' time out of school during recessions
is employed in non market activities.
Our empirical ¯ndings reveal important adverse e®ects on human capital accumulation
by Argentinean youth due to the presence of credit market imperfections during the eco-
nomic crisis of the late 1990's and early 2000's. We ¯nd evidence that household heads'
job losses were associated with higher levels of labor market involvement for boys, which
then reduced their schooling performance. For girls unemployment spells by the head also
led to reductions in schooling e®ort and upgrading probabilities, however, girls' time was
most likely employed in home rather than market production. Our results suggests poten-
tial mechanisms to understand the poor schooling performance of Argentinean children and
teens during recessionary years.
19Note that the import penetration instrument is constructed using the method of the ¯xed coe±cients,
and thus already takes in account this problem.
246 Conclusions
This paper examines the implications of credit market failures for human capital investment
decisions in Argentina during the period from 1995 to 2002. Our results suggest a remarkable
negative and statistically signi¯cant e®ect of household heads' work career interruptions on
the schooling progress of children during years of economic distress. We also ¯nd evidence
that during periods of economic instability, in response to household head unemployment
shocks, boys increase their involvement in labor market activities whereas girls seem to
increase participation in home production. We interpret these results as evidence that dur-
ing the Argentinean economic recession between 1999 and 2002, credit markets collapsed
signi¯cantly a®ecting households' insurance strategies and investment decisions.
Our ¯ndings indicate that macroeconomic crises can potentially have a persistent e®ect
on the well-being of subsequent generations. If children left behind as a result of parental
job losses do not catch up with their cohort counterparts, macroeconomic shocks will have
a persistent e®ect on the level of inequality of younger generations. Therefore policies de-
signed to protect and boost the schooling enrollment of children during periods of economic
turbulence would be desirable to prevent temporary shocks a®ecting the current working
population to have a permanent e®ect on subsequent generations.
25Table 1: Schooling advancement BOYS
all years 1995-2002 Crisis 1999-2002 Growth 1996-1998
Equation 1 : employment status of the household head Eit
age hh 0.041¤ (0.022) 0.013 (0.032) 0.02 (0.035)
age2 hh 0.000¤ (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
hh no educ -0.509¤¤¤ (0.168) -0.293 (0.250) -0.722¤¤ (0.297)
hh primary -0.128¤¤ (0.060) -0.071 (0.087) -0.099 (0.095)
hh second -0.068 (0.056) 0.102 (0.081) -0.162¤ (0.088)
gender hh -0.092 (0.086) -0.338¤¤¤ (0.119) 0.142 (0.141)
room 0.013 (0.009) 0.075¤¤¤ (0.023) -0.012 (0.011)
owner 0.080¤ (0.048) 0.06 (0.073) 0.159¤¤ (0.073)
cat60 -0.095 (0.065) -0.071 (0.103) -0.128 (0.098)
size fam -0.020¤¤ (0.010) -0.023¤ (0.014) -0.009 (0.016)
tot18 0.001 (0.004) -0.005 (0.007) 0.005 (0.006)
sp no educ -0.381¤¤ (0.157) -0.254 (0.229) -0.228 (0.289)
spouse prim -0.169¤¤ (0.066) -0.218¤¤ (0.096) -0.158 (0.105)
spouse sec -0.105¤ (0.060) -0.183¤¤ (0.087) -0.003 (0.096)
work sp -0.084¤¤ (0.038) -0.09 (0.057) -0.117¤ (0.061)
d96 -0.099 (0.065) -0.051 (0.066)
d97 -0.041 (0.071)
d98 -0.043 (0.071) -0.004 (0.068)
d99 -0.136¤¤ (0.069) 0.199¤¤¤ (0.067)
d00 -0.133¤ (0.069) 0.201¤¤¤ (0.067)
d01 -0.340¤¤¤ (0.067)
d02 -0.189¤¤ (0.075) 0.134¤ (0.074)
reg dumm YES YES YES
Equation 2 : School promotion
Eit 0.471¤¤ (0.232) 0.459 (0.385) 0.116 (0.140)
marginal e®ects 0.153¤¤ (0.065) 0.143 (0.102) 0.034 (0.040)
age -0.948¤¤¤ (0.145) -1.095¤¤¤ (0.223) -0.869¤¤¤ (0.224)
age2 0.029¤¤¤ (0.005) 0.034¤¤¤ (0.008) 0.027¤¤¤ (0.008)
schoolk 0.018 (0.064) 0.037 (0.099) 0.107 (0.099)
hh no educ -0.469¤¤¤ (0.162) -0.540¤¤ (0.231) -0.526¤ (0.293)
hh primary -0.265¤¤¤ (0.054) -0.299¤¤¤ (0.080) -0.268¤¤¤ (0.082)
hh second -0.117¤¤ (0.051) -0.156¤¤ (0.075) -0.114 (0.079)
sp no educ -0.334¤¤¤ (0.061) -0.355¤¤¤ (0.088) -0.303¤¤¤ (0.097)
sp primary -0.239¤¤¤ (0.059) -0.215¤¤ (0.087) -0.274¤¤¤ (0.093)
sp second -0.168¤¤¤ (0.055) -0.149¤ (0.080) -0.203¤¤ (0.087)
d96 0.144¤¤¤ (0.054) -0.100¤ (0.056)
d97 0.245¤¤¤ (0.057) 0.285¤¤¤ (0.066)
d98 0.498¤¤¤ (0.061)
d99 0.370¤¤¤ (0.061)
d00 0.286¤¤¤ (0.060) 0.089 (0.064)
d01 0.277¤¤¤ (0.061) -0.003 (0.064)
d02 0.245¤¤¤ (0.067) -0.028 (0.070)
¢ln W -0.122¤ (0.069) -0.071 (0.089) -0.315¤¤ (0.126)
reg dumm YES YES YES
½1;2 -0.230¤ (0.127) 0.096 (0.072) -0.045 (0.066)
Nr obs 8597 3821 3679
28Table 2: Schooling advancement BOYS; biprobit results
all years 1995-2002 Crisis 1999-2002 Growth 1996-1998
Equation 1 : employment status of the household head Eit
exprice -0.004 ¤¤¤ (0.000) -0.004 ¤¤¤ (0.001) -0.003 ¤¤¤ (0.001)
age hh 0.036 (0.022) 0.024 (0.032) 0.015 (0.035)
age2 hh 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000)
hh no educ -0.446 ¤¤¤ (0.169) -0.134 (0.252) -0.663 ¤¤ (0.297)
hh primary -0.072 (0.061) 0.002 (0.089) -0.051 (0.097)
hh second -0.025 (0.057) 0.149 ¤ (0.082) -0.122 ¤ (0.090)
gender hh -0.116 (0.082) -0.260 ¤¤ (0.112) -0.092 ¤¤ (0.135)
Family char. YES YES YES
reg dumm YES YES YES
time dumm YES YES YES
Equation 2 : School promotion
Et 0.474 (0.329) 0.533 ¤ (0.305) -0.168 (0.576)
Marg e® 0.154¤ (0.092) 0.169 ¤¤ (0.080) -0.046 (0.170)
age -0.956 ¤¤¤ (0.145) -1.081 ¤¤¤ (0.222) -0.869 ¤¤¤ (0.225)
age2 0.029 ¤¤¤ (0.005) 0.034 ¤¤¤ (0.008) 0.027 ¤¤¤ (0.008)
school obl. 0.018 (0.064) 0.036 (0.097) 0.105 (0.099)
hh no educ -0.465 ¤¤¤ (0.169) -0.456 ¤ (0.234) -0.589 ¤ (0.311)
hh primary -0.263 ¤¤¤ (0.055) -0.275 ¤¤¤ (0.081) -0.272 ¤¤¤ (0.083)
hh second. -0.110 ¤¤ (0.050) -0.166 ¤¤ (0.074) -0.114 (0.079)
m. no educ -0.334 ¤¤¤ (0.061) -0.342 ¤¤¤ (0.087) -0.298 ¤¤¤ (0.097)
m. primary -0.237 ¤¤¤ (0.060) -0.175 ¤¤ (0.088) -0.281 ¤¤¤ (0.093)
m. second. -0.167 ¤¤¤ (0.055) -0.119 (0.081) -0.201 ¤¤ (0.087)
¢ln W -0.125 ¤ (0.069) -0.069 (0.088) -0.313 ¤¤ (0.125)
reg dumm YES YES YES
time dumm YES YES YES
½1;2 -0.238 (0.186) -0.264 (0.177) 0.111 (0.322)
Nr obs 8597 3821 3679
29Table 3: Schooling advancement BOYS: IV estimates
all years 1995-2002 Crisis 1999-2002 Growth 1996-1998
Equation 2 : Schooling advancement BOYS
Eit 0.204¤ (0.111) 0.257¤¤ (0.123) 0.057 (0.205)
age -0.255¤¤¤ (0.044) -0.282¤¤¤ (0.065) -0.230¤¤¤ (0.067)
age2 0.008¤¤¤ (0.002) 0.009¤¤¤ (0.002) 0.007¤¤¤ (0.002)
school obl. 0.012 (0.022) 0.020 (0.033) 0.042 (0.032)
hh no educ -0.144¤¤ (0.061) -0.133 (0.085) -0.166 (0.106)
hh primary -0.074¤¤¤ (0.015) -0.072¤¤¤ (0.022) -0.077¤¤¤ (0.022)
hh second -0.029¤¤ (0.013) -0.043¤¤ (0.019) -0.030 (0.021)
m. no educ -0.092¤¤¤ (0.016) -0.093¤¤¤ (0.023) -0.082¤¤¤ (0.025)
m. primary -0.059¤¤¤ (0.016) -0.033 (0.023) -0.073¤¤¤ (0.024)
m. second. -0.040¤¤¤ (0.014) -0.022 (0.020) -0.052¤¤ (0.021)
¢ln W -0.037¤ (0.020) -0.022 (0.025) -0.092¤¤¤ (0.035)
reg dumm YES YES YES
time dumm YES YES YES





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































31Table 5: Schooling advancement GIRLS
all years 1995-2002 Crisis 1999-2002 Growth 1996-1998
Equation 2 : Schooling advancement GIRLS
Eprice -0.004 ¤¤¤ (0.000) -0.004 ¤¤¤ (0.001) -0.003 ¤¤¤ (0.001)
age hh 0.041 ¤ (0.021) -0.012 (0.033) 0.027 (0.036)
age hh2 0.000 ¤ (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
hh no edu -0.319 ¤ (0.174) -0.393 (0.255) -0.357 (0.287)
hh primary -0.108 ¤ (0.063) -0.022 (0.091) -0.167 (0.103)
hh second -0.109 ¤ (0.058) -0.034 (0.083) -0.139 (0.096)
gender hh -0.053 (0.084) -0.205 ¤ (0.122) 0.171 (0.138)
Family char. YES YES YES
reg dumm YES YES YES
time dumm YES YES YES
Equation 2 : School promotion
Et 0.882 ¤¤¤ (0.207) 0.533 ¤ (0.273) 0.329 (0.498)
Marg e® 0.287 ¤¤¤ (0.050) 0.154 ¤¤ (0.063) 0.094 (0.126)
age -0.585 ¤¤¤ (0.144) -0.959 ¤¤¤ (0.233) -0.290 (0.229)
age2 0.014 ¤¤¤ (0.005) 0.027 ¤¤¤ (0.008) 0.004 (0.008)
school obl. -0.291 ¤¤¤ (0.065) -0.286 ¤¤¤ (0.102) -0.242 ¤¤ (0.104)
hh no educ -0.164 (0.171) 0.401 (0.329) -0.430 (0.282)
hh primary -0.159 ¤¤¤ (0.056) -0.202 ¤¤ (0.084) -0.216 ¤¤ (0.094)
hh second. -0.061 (0.052) -0.083 (0.079) -0.147 ¤ (0.088)
m. no educ -0.298 ¤¤¤ (0.063) -0.326 ¤¤¤ (0.093) -0.246 ¤¤ (0.104)
m. primary -0.21 ¤¤¤ (0.062) -0.212 ¤¤ (0.097) -0.198 ¤¤ (0.098)
m. second. -0.227 ¤¤¤ (0.057) -0.207 ¤¤ (0.087) -0.224 ¤¤ (0.092)
¢ln W 0.158 ¤¤ (0.070) 0.191 ¤¤ (0.091) -0.085 (0.133)
reg dumm YES YES YES
time dumm YES YES YES
½1;2 -0.471 ¤¤¤ (0.132) -0.263 (0.162) -0.132 (0.271)


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































33APPENDIX A - Data appendix
Table A-1: Macroeconomic summary
Indicator 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Real GDP growth -2.8 5.5 8.1 3.9 -3.4 -0.8 -4.4 -10.9
Urban unempl, Oct. 16.6 17.3 13.7 12.4 13.8 14,7 18.3 17.8
Consumer Price Index 3.4 0.2 0.5 0.9 -1.2 -0.9 -1.1 25.9
Imports growth -9.8 17.5 26.9 8.4 -11.3 -0.2 -13.9 -50.1
Exports growth 22.5 7.6 12.2 10.6 -1.3 2.7 2.7 3.1
Export price index 108.8 115.9 111.9 100.3 89.1 98.0 94.7 91.0
Source: INDEC. All indicators except export price index are in percentage.
Export price index refers to 1993= 100.
34Table A-2: Educational statistics by grade years 1996-2002.
promotion rates by grade and year
mandatory schooling - EGB Polimodal
gr. 1 gr. 2 gr. 3 gr. 4 gr. 5 gr. 6 gr. 7 gr. 8 gr. 9 gr.10 gr.11 gr.12
1996 88.34 91.03 92.67 93.06 93.28 93.62 92.11 67.19 68.32 78.46 85.21 72.85
1997 88.57 91.77 93.04 93.69 93.83 93.38 99.27 76.79 68.08 81.84 86.43 73.40
1998 88.15 91.97 92.50 93.42 93.69 93.50 99.02 76.35 77.08 81.39 86.88 74.39
1999 87.59 91.76 92.61 93.19 93.33 92.88 96.52 78.97 76.35 80.86 88.52 74.16
2000 87.11 91.62 92.46 92.85 93.26 90.66 94.55 79.16 75.86 79.18 84.33 65.23
2001 86.88 91.71 92.50 93.07 93.60 92.79 93.17 80.30 80.13 80.51 85.07 77.11
2002 86.92 91.64 92.47 92.68 93.08 92.87 92.66 79.77 79.84 77.40 81.95 77.17
repetition rates by grade and year
mandatory schooling - EGB Polimodal
gr. 1 gr. 2 gr. 3 gr. 4 gr. 5 gr. 6 gr. 7 gr. 8 gr. 9 gr.10 gr.11 gr.12
1996 9.13 7.37 5.64 4.92 3.91 3.03 2.03 10.79 13.91 9.07 5.21 1.12
1997 9.00 6.76 5.64 4.55 3.77 2.97 2.64 11.63 12.11 9.51 4.86 1.06
1998 9.51 6.76 6.26 5.02 4.20 3.44 3.48 11.42 9.87 8.95 4.76 0.95
1999 9.93 7.06 6.10 5.23 4.61 3.78 4.41 10.69 9.51 8.09 3.95 0.99
2000 10.38 7.25 6.38 5.56 4.72 3.87 5.14 10.81 9.26 8.23 5.73 0.83
2001 9.94 7.05 6.15 5.20 4.30 3.60 5.07 9.70 8.01 7.24 5.31 0.78
2002 9.95 7.05 6.17 5.53 4.70 3.82 5.70 10.35 8.85 8.42 6.40 0.55
percentage of lagging behind children - older than the "on-time" age
mandatory schooling - EGB Polimodal
gr. 1 gr. 2 gr. 3 gr. 4 gr. 5 gr. 6 gr. 7 gr. 8 gr. 9 gr.10 gr.11 gr.12
1996 13.57 20.31 23.10 25.11 25.29 25.62 26.56 40.39 42.05 38.76 37.13 32.00
1997 13.6 20.3 23.1 25.1 25.3 25.6 26.6 40.4 42.1 38.8 37.1 32.0
1998 14.5 18.9 23.3 25.1 26.4 26.1 26.4 38.1 40.7 40.1 36.7 33.3
1999 15.1 19.2 21.1 23.9 24.7 25.7 26.2 36.0 36.9 40.2 37.4 32.5
2000 15.1 20.1 21.8 22.4 24.4 25.1 27.3 34.8 35.5 37.8 37.3 33.8
2001 15.09 20.17 23.07 23.79 23.59 25.03 27.85 35.14 35.16 37.59 36.66 34.00
2002 16.31 20.80 23.91 25.55 25.63 25.12 28.58 35.14 35.78 37.84 36.69 32.91
percentage of drop outs by grade and year
mandatory schooling - EGB Polimodal
gr. 1 gr. 2 gr. 3 gr. 4 gr. 5 gr. 6 gr. 7 gr. 8 gr. 9 gr.10 gr.11 gr.12
1996 2.53 1.60 1.69 2.02 2.81 3.34 5.86 22.03 17.77 12.46 9.57 26.03
1997 2.42 1.47 1.32 1.76 2.41 3.65 -1.91 11.58 19.81 8.65 8.72 25.53
1998 2.34 1.27 1.24 1.56 2.11 3.06 -2.51 12.23 13.05 9.66 8.36 24.66
1999 2.48 1.18 1.29 1.59 2.06 3.34 -0.94 10.34 14.13 11.06 7.53 24.85
2000 2.51 1.12 1.15 1.59 2.02 5.46 0.31 10.03 14.88 12.59 9.94 33.94
2001 3.18 1.25 1.35 1.73 2.11 3.61 1.76 10.00 11.86 12.24 9.62 22.11
2002 3.12 1.31 1.36 1.79 2.21 3.31 1.64 9.87 11.31 14.18 11.66 22.29
Source: Ministry of Education of Argentina
35Table A-3: Percentage of household heads not su®ering unemployment spells during the year
by level of education.
year primary school secondary school tertiary education
1995 86.25 87 94.49
1996 84.62 85.74 89.32
1997 86.42 86.44 91.59
1998 84 87.79 89.16
1999 80.36 85.67 87.5
2000 79.46 85.15 88.44
2001 73.85 82.33 88.01
2002 82.80 85.27 87
Table A-4: School promotion by labor market participation, BOYS. Years 1995-2002
younger than 15 years older than 15 years
year Non active Active Non active Active
1995 73.42 41.53 65.10 40.57
1996 77.87 66.66 68.40 50
1997 80.61 72 72.09 61.53
1998 84.76 74.41 79.73 74.66
1999 83.23 73.80 76.58 65.71
2000 81.85 56.25 73.77 65
2001 80.66 53.57 73.77 72.13
2002 79.44 64.70 75.56 59.52
36Table A-5: Sample statistics
Percentage of labor force participation
year HH head always employed HH head not always employed
younger than 15 older than 15 younger than 15 older than 15
female male female male female male female male
1995 2.05 6.88 16.28 15.78 0 16.85 20 31.91
1996 2.59 6.35 10.59 22 4.27 6.73 13.69 17.14
1997 2.50 5.99 11.23 23.10 3.12 7.54 14 25.64
1998 3.17 5.68 11.11 20.88 2.70 4.21 13.46 14
1999 2.54 8.03 13.11 19.41 2.41 5.02 11.11 17.77
2000 2.39 3.66 9.15 15.22 4.13 8.10 10 30.43
2001 1.19 4.04 10.50 15.86 2.23 2.85 9.67 23.80
2002 1.22 3.29 7.27 16.50 1.31 5.71 14.28 13.95
Percentage of school progress
year HH head always employed HH head not always employed
younger than 15 older than 15 younger than 15 older than 15
female male female male female male female male
1995 77.27 70.53 60.28 62.53 72.81 73.03 62.5 55.31
1996 81.85 76.98 70.28 64.54 77.77 76.92 75.34 61.42
1997 84.63 80.65 76.96 70.21 81.25 75.47 72 64.10
1998 86.32 84.48 80.99 83.78 80.23 83.15 75 86
1999 83.81 82.74 82.89 77.02 87.09 84.82 79.36 64.44
2000 81.54 82 81.01 71.97 82.06 74.77 84 69.56
2001 83.10 79.57 78.59 75.64 80.59 80.71 70.96 65.07
2002 86.24 79.74 80.90 72.51 73.68 80 65.71 72.09
37Table A-6: First stage BOYS
all years 1995-2002 Crisis 1999-2002 Growth 1996-1998
Equation 1 : Employment status household head Eit
Eprice -0.001¤¤¤ (0.000) -0.001¤¤¤ (0.000) -0.001¤¤¤ (0.000)
age hh 0.006 (0.006) 0.003 (0.009) 0.005 (0.010)
age2hh 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
hh no educ -0.124¤¤ (0.054) -0.053 (0.073) -0.135 (0.116)
hh primary -0.012 (0.014) 0.002 (0.021) -0.024 (0.023)
hh second 0.000 (0.012) 0.037¤¤ (0.018) -0.028 (0.022)
gender hh -0.027 (0.020) -0.056¤¤ (0.026) 0.042 (0.039)
nrs room 0.004 (0.006) 0.017¤¤¤ (0.006) -0.006¤¤ (0.003)
house owner 0.020¤ (0.011) 0.017 (0.018) 0.067¤¤¤ (0.022)
nr pensioners -0.024 (0.016) -0.023 (0.026) -0.026 (0.029)
size family -0.004 (0.002) -0.007¤ (0.004) 0.000 (0.004)
nr kids <= 18 yrs 0.000 (0.001) -0.001 (0.002) 0.000 (0.001)
m no educ -0.037¤ (0.022) -0.058¤ (0.031) 0.039 (0.043)
m primary -0.038¤¤ (0.015) -0.046¤¤ (0.022) -0.023 (0.028)
m second -0.022¤ (0.013) -0.037¤ (0.019) 0.018 (0.025)
m works -0.017¤ (0.009) -0.02 (0.014) -0.034¤¤ (0.017)
d96 -0.01 (0.014) 0.000 (0.000)
d97 0.01 (0.015) -0.003 (0.014)
d98 0.012 (0.015) 0.000 (0.000)
d99 -0.023 (0.015) 0.033¤¤ (0.017)
d00 -0.009 (0.015) 0.050¤¤¤ (0.017)
d01 -0.060¤¤¤ (0.016) 0.000 (0.000)
d02 -0.027 (0.017) 0.027 (0.019)
reg dumm. YES YES YES
Obs 8600 3822 2253
R2 0.0279 0.0422 0.0277
38Table A-7: First stage GIRLS
all years 1995-2002 Crisis 1999-2002 Growth 1996-1998
Equation 1 : Employment status household head Eit
Eprice -0.001¤¤¤ (0.000) -0.001¤¤¤ (0.000) 0.000¤¤¤ (0.000)
age hh 0.006 (0.006) -0.006 (0.009) 0.004 (0.011)
age2 hh 0 (0.000) 0 (0.000) 0 (0.000)
hh no educ -0.083 (0.051) -0.11 (0.086) 0.067 (0.068)
hh primary -0.024¤ (0.013) 0 (0.020) -0.042¤ (0.023)
hh second -0.021¤ (0.012) -0.002 (0.018) -0.033 (0.021)
gender hh -0.016 (0.018) -0.055¤¤ (0.024) 0.082¤¤ (0.039)
Nrs room 0.006¤¤ (0.003) 0.012¤¤ (0.006) 0.003 (0.002)
home owner 0.036¤¤¤ (0.012) 0.082¤¤¤ (0.021) 0.025 (0.022)
nrs pensioners -0.030¤ (0.017) -0.051¤ (0.028) -0.068¤¤ (0.031)
size family -0.010¤¤¤ (0.002) -0.014¤¤¤ (0.004) -0.002 (0.004)
nrs kids <= 18 yrs -0.001 (0.001) -0.003¤ (0.002) 0.001 (0.002)
m no educ -0.034 (0.021) -0.088¤¤¤ (0.030) 0.067¤ (0.041)
m. primary -0.050¤¤¤ (0.014) -0.079¤¤¤ (0.023) -0.03 (0.028)
m. second -0.01 (0.013) -0.024 (0.019) 0.04 (0.025)
m. works -0.026¤¤¤ (0.009) -0.041¤¤¤ (0.015) -0.026 (0.017)
d96 -0.015 (0.014) 0 (0.000)
d97 0.014 (0.014) 0.012 (0.014)
d98 0.003 (0.015) 0 (0.000)
d99 -0.052¤¤¤ (0.015) 0.012 (0.017)
d00 -0.047¤¤¤ (0.015) 0.019 (0.017)
d01 -0.065¤¤¤ (0.016) 0 (0.000)
d02 -0.022 (0.016) 0.039¤¤ (0.018)
reg dumm. YES YES YES
Obs 8528 3769 2274
R2 0.0386 0.0602 0.0292
39References
Altug, S. and Miller, R. A. (1990), `Household Choices in Equilibrium', Econometrica
58(3), 543{570.
Attanasio, O. and Sz¶ ekely, M. (2004), `Wage shocks and consumption variability in Mexico
during the 1990s', Journal of Development Economics 73, 1{25.
Bertrand, M. (2004), `From the Invisible Handshake to the Invisible Hand? How Im-
port Competition Changes the Employment Relationship', Journal of Labor Economics
22, 723.
Calvo, G., Izquierdo, A. and Talvi, E. (2003), Sudden stops, the real exchange rate and ¯scal
sustainability: Argentina's lessons, in v. F. G. M. Alexander V, Mlitz J, ed., `Monetary
Unions and Hard Pegs', Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, pp. 150{181.
Capellari, L. and Jenkins, S. (2003), `Multivariate probit regression using simulated maxi-
mum likelihood', The Stata Journal 3(3), 278{94.
Card, D. (2001), `Immigrant In°ows, Native Out°ows, and the Local Market Impacts of
Higher Immigration', Journal of Labor Economics 19(1), 22{64.
Cigno, A. and Rosati, F. C. (2005), `Why do Indian children work, and is it bad for them?',
IZA Working Paper 115.
Corbacho, A., Garcia-Escribano, M. and Inchauste, G. (2007), `Argentina: Macroeconomic
Crisis and Household Vulnerability', Review of Development Economics 11(1), 92106.
Cullen, J. and Gruber, J. (2000), `Does unemployment insurance crowd out spousal labor
supply?', Journal of Labor Economics 18(3), 546{72.
Duryea, S. (1998), `Children's advancement through school in Brazil: the role of transitory
shocks to household income.', IADB Working Paper 376.
Duryea, S., Lam, D. and Levinson, D. (2007), `E®ects of Economic Shocks on Children's
Employment and Schooling in Brazil', Journal of Development Economics 84, 118{214.
Emerson, P. M. and Souza, A. P. (2002), `Child Labor, School Attendance, and Intra-
household Gender Bias in Brazil', Working Papers 0212, Department of Economics,
Vanderbilt University. .
Frankenberg, E., Smith, J. P. and Thomas, D. (2003), `Economic Shocks, Wealth, and
Welfare', The Journal of Human Resources 38(2), 280{321.
Freeman, R. B. (1975), `Supply and Salary Adjustments to the Changing Science Manpower
Market: Physics, 1948-1973', American Economic Review 65(1), 27{39.
Freeman, R. B. (1980), `The Exit-Voice Tradeo® in the Labor Market: Unionism, Job Tenure,
Quits, and Separations', Quarterly Journal of Economics 94(4), 643{73.
26Galiani, S. and Hopenhayn, H. (2003), `Duration and risk of unemployment in Argentina',
Journal of Development Economics 71(1), 199{212.
Galiani, S. and Sanguinetti, P. (2003), `The impact of trade liberalization on wage inequality:
evidence from Argentina', Journal of Development Economics 72, 497{513.
Giovagnoli, P. I., Fiszbein, A. and Adriz, I. (2003), `El impacto de la crisis argentina en el
bienestar de los hogares', Revista de la Cepal 79.
Ham, J. C. and Jacobs, K. (2000), `Testing for Full Insurance Using Exogenous Information',
Journal of Business & Economic Statistics 18(4), 387{397.
Jacoby, H. (1994), `Borrowing constraints and progress through school: evidence from Peru',
Review of Economics and Statistics 76, 151{160.
Jacoby, H. and Skou¯as, E. (1997), `Risk, Financial Markets, and Human Capital in a
Developing Country', Review of Economic Studies 64, 311{335.
Katz, L. F. and Murphy, K. M. (1992), `Changes in Relative Wages, 1963-1987: Supply and
Demand Factors', Quarterly Journal of Economics 107(1), 35{78.
Levison, D., Moe, K. S. and Knaul, F. M. (2001), `Youth Education and Work in Mexico',
World Development 29(1), 167{188.
McKenzie, D. J. (2004), `Aggregate Shocks and Urban Labor Market Responses: Evi-
dence from Argentina's Financial Crisis', Economic Development and Cultural Change
52(4), 719{58.
Mulligan, C. B. (1997), Parental Priorities and Economic Inequality, University of Chicago
Press, Chicago.
Parker, S. W. and Skou¯as, E. (2006), `Job loss and family adjustment in work and schooling
during the Mexican peso crisis.', Journal of Population Economics 19, 163{81.
Revenga, A. (1992), `Exporting Jobs? The Impact of Import Competition on Employment
and Wages in U.S. Manufacturing', Quarterly Journal of Economics 107(1), 255{84.
Schady, N. (2002), `The (Positive) E®ect of Macroeconomic Crises on the Schooling and Em-
ployment Decisions of a Middle Income Country', World Bank POLICY RESEARCH
WORKING PAPER 2762.
Solon, G. (1999), Intergenerational Mobility in the Labor Market, Vol. 3 of Handbook of Labor
Economics, North-Holland, Amsterdam.
Thomas, D., Beegle, K., Frankenberg, E., Sikoki, B., Strauss, J. and Teruel, G. (2004),
`Education in a crisis', Journal of Development Economics 74(1), 54{85.
Toledo, M. (2008), `On the Intergenerational Persistence of Work Hours', Manuscript U.
Carlos III Madrid .




WP-AD 2009-01   “Does sex education influence sexual and reproductive behaviour of 
    women? Evidence from Mexico” 
          P. Ortiz. February 2009. 
 
WP-AD 2009-02   “Expectations  and  Forward Risk Premium in the Spanish Power 
 Market” 
          M.D. Furió. February 2009.  
 
WP-AD 2009-03   “Solving the incomplete markets model with aggregate uncertainty 
    using the Krusell-Smith algorithm” 
          L. Maliar, S. Maliar, F. Valli. February 2009. 
 
WP-AD 2009-04   “Employee  types  and  endofenous organizational design: An     
experiment” 
          A. Cunyat, R. Sloof. February 2009. 
 
WP-AD 2009-05   “Quality of Life Lost Due to Road Crashes” 
          P. Cubí. February 2009. 
 
WP-AD 2009-06     “The Role of Search Frictions for Output and Inflation Dynamics: A 
   Bayesian  Assessment” 
        M.  Menner.  March  2009. 
 
WP-AD  2009-07      “Factors affecting the schooling performance of secondary school 
    pupils – the cost of high unemployment and imperfect financial  
   markets” 
          L. Farré, C. Trentini. March 2009. 
 
WP-AD  2009-08      “Sexual orientation and household  decision  making.  Same-sex       
    couples’ balance of power and labor supply choices” 
          S. Oreffice. March 2009. 
 
WP-AD 2009-09     “Advertising and business cycle fluctuations” 
  B. Molinari, F. Turino. March 2009. 
 
WP-AD 2009-10   “Education and selective vouchers” 
    A. Piolatto. March 2009. 
 
WP-AD 2009-11       “Does increasing parents’ schooling raise the schooling of the next 
     generation? Evidence based on conditional second moments” 
  L. Farré, R. Klein, F. Vella. March 2009. 
                                                 
     
* Please contact IVIE's Publications Department to obtain a list of publications previous to 2009. Ivie
Guardia Civil, 22 - Esc. 2, 1º
46020 Valencia - Spain
Phone: +34 963 190 050
Fax: +34 963 190 055
Department of Economics
University of Alicante
Campus San Vicente del Raspeig
03071 Alicante - Spain
Phone: +34 965 903 563
Fax: +34 965 903 898
Website: http://www.ivie.es
E-mail: publicaciones@ivie.es
ad
serie